UNITED NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/121
5 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached letter dated 23 December 1998 from Mr. James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, concerning the Central African Republic (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-03086 (E) 050299

/...

Annex

Letter dated 23 December 1998 from the President of the World Bank addressed to the Secretary-General

I understand that you will soon report to the Security Council on progress made by the Central African Republic towards restoring peace and security, and present your recommendations on the future of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) presently there. I would like to share with you our assessment of the prospects of the Central African Republic's financial consolidation and the economic reform programme being implemented with the Bretton Woods institutions, and our views on the link between this programme and peacekeeping arrangements.

The international community entered into an unwritten compact when it decided to help restore peace and reverse increasing poverty in the Central African Republic. In a series of mutually reinforcing actions, the Security Council dispatched a peacekeeping force and the Bretton Woods institutions pledged their support for an economic reform programme, while other partners are assisting in the organization and monitoring of legislative elections. So far, the results are yielding fruit - security has improved, the first round of legislative elections have passed peacefully and the economic situation has stabilized. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved an enhanced structural adjustment facility last July. The International Development Association sponsored a donors' meeting last June, and is currently preparing a quick disbursing credit to support economic policy reform. We plan to return to the Central African Republic in January together with IMF, with a view to assessing the feasibility of such an operation in the spring of 1999.

Should MINURCA forces start withdrawing on 15 January, as envisaged by Security Council resolution 1201 (1998) of 15 October 1998, the prospects for continued economic improvement would be considerably weakened. The security situation could well deteriorate again. Political tensions would likely intensify during the approach to presidential elections scheduled for August, while the task of restructuring the armed forces remains incomplete. These heightened security concerns would be bound to influence our decision on whether to present a policy-based credit to our Board.

I would like to ask you to consider these factors when preparing your recommendation to the Security Council. We believe that the Central African Republic will be at a turning point in 1999. The premature withdrawal of international support in any of the key areas could easily undermine and even reverse the fragile progress made so far.

(Signed) James D. WOLFENSOHN

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/122
26 February 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, France, Gabon, Japan, Kenya, Senegal, Togo and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1125 (1997) of 6 August 1997, 1136 (1997) of 6 November 1997, 1152 (1998) of 5 February 1998, 1155 (1998) of 16 March 1998, 1159 (1998) of 27 March 1998, 1182 (1998) of 14 July 1998 and 1201 (1998) of 15 October 1998,

Welcoming the holding of free and fair legislative elections on 22 November and 13 December 1998,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 18 December 1998 (S/1998/1203) and its annex of 14 January 1999 (S/1998/1203/Add.1) and the report of the Secretary-General of 29 January 1999 (S/1999/98) and taking note of the recommendations contained therein,

Taking note of the request of 8 December 1998 from the President of the Central African Republic to the Secretary-General (S/1999/116, annex), and the letter of 23 January 1999 from the President of the Central African Republic to the Secretary-General (S/1999/98, annex),

Reiterating the importance of the work done by the joint committee of the Government of the Central African Republic and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) to address the restructuring of the Central African armed forces (FACA), and stressing the necessity quickly to adopt the draft law and decrees on national defence and the structure of the defence forces,

Reaffirming the link between socio-economic progress and the consolidation of peace in the Central African Republic, and in that context taking note of the letter of 23 December 1998 from the President of the World Bank to the Secretary-General (S/1999/121, annex),

Recalling the importance of regional stability and the need to consolidate the progress achieved so far, and in particular to assist the people of the Central African Republic to consolidate the process of national reconciliation taking into account the need to maintain a secure and stable environment

conducive to the economic recovery and to the holding of free and fair presidential elections,

Stressing the importance of cooperation and understanding by the Government of the Central African Republic, the newly elected legislators and the political groupings, so as to ensure the effective functioning of the National Assembly,

Emphasizing the need for the Government of the Central African Republic to set the presidential election dates as soon as possible, in accordance with article 23 of the Constitution of the Central African Republic,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURCA until 15 November 1999;

2. Expresses its intention to commence the reduction of MINURCA personnel 15 days after the conclusion of the presidential elections in the Central African Republic with a view to full termination of the Mission no later than 15 November 1999;

3. Further decides to review every 45 days, on the basis of reports of the Secretary-General, the mandate of MINURCA in light of the progress achieved towards implementation of the commitments made by the President of the Central African Republic to the Secretary-General in his letter of 23 January 1999;

4. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to discuss with the President of the Central African Republic plans for the possibility of a progressive reduction of the MINURCA military component in anticipation of the 15 November 1999 termination date of the Mission, commensurate with the advances in the restructuring of the FACA, including taking into account the need to ensure the stability and security of Bangui;

5. Urges the international community to lend its support to the restructuring of the security forces of the Central African Republic, including the Gendarmerie, through bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, and reaffirms the role of MINURCA in providing advice in the restructuring of the security forces of the Central African Republic and, in this connection, in coordinating and channelling international support to this end;

6. Strongly reaffirms that the complete implementation of the Bangui Agreements (S/1997/561, appendices III-VI) and of the National Reconciliation Pact (S/1998/219) is essential to peace and national reconciliation in the Central African Republic, and urges the Government of the Central African Republic to continue to take concrete steps to implement political, economic, social and security reforms as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 1998 (S/1998/148) and to fulfil the commitments expressed in the letter of 8 January 1998 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic (S/1998/61, annex) and in the letter of 23 January 1999 to the Secretary-General from the President of the Central African Republic;

7. Calls upon all parties in the Central African Republic, with the assistance of the special representative of the Secretary-General, to take the

necessary measures to resolve the current political impasse, with a view to enhancing the national reconciliation process;

8. Further calls upon the Government of the Central African Republic to establish the new electoral commission as soon as possible in order to organize the presidential elections, and to establish and adhere to a timetable for the holding of these elections;

9. Authorizes MINURCA to play a supportive role in the conduct of the presidential elections, in conformity with the tasks previously performed during the legislative elections of 22 November and 13 December 1998, recognizing the major responsibility which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will have in the coordination of electoral assistance;

10. Further authorizes MINURCA to supervise the destruction of confiscated weapons and ammunition under MINURCA control as recommended in paragraph 29 of the report of the Secretary-General of 18 December 1998;

11. Encourages an increased role for an increased number of FACA troops to support the presidential elections process, to include the deployment of FACA troops to electoral sites to assist MINURCA personnel in the provision of security and logistical support, and notes in this exceptional case that those FACA troops assisting MINURCA in this context would during that time operate under United Nations rules of engagement;

12. Welcomes the commitments made by the President of the Central African Republic in his letter to the Secretary-General of 23 January 1999 and urges the Government of the Central African Republic to fulfil these commitments, in particular:

(a) To expedite the legislative process regarding national defence and the structure of defence forces with a view to adopting draft laws and decrees as prepared by the joint committee of the Government of the Central African Republic and MINURCA, by 15 April 1999;

(b) To take steps to limit the mission of the Special Defence Force of the Republican Institutions (FORSDIR) to the protection of the Republican Institutions and of high-level authorities, excluding all police and maintenance of law and order tasks;

(c) To continue to implement with the support of MINURCA the demobilization and reintegration programme funded by UNDP;

(d) To establish no later than 1 April 1999 an implementation programme in accordance with the timetable established by the joint committee of the Government of the Central African Republic and MINURCA which should specify the key elements of the restructuring programme of the FACA to be implemented, among them the need to create well-balanced geographical and multi-ethnic recruitment, the improvement of working conditions, including payment of salary and salary arrears, the provision of adequate infrastructure, equipment and support materials, and the redeployment of some of the restructured units outside Bangui;

13. Also urges the Government of the Central African Republic to meet the requirements of the financial consolidation and economic reform programmes agreed with the international financial institutions;

14. Requests the Government of the Central African Republic to refrain from any involvement in external conflicts, in conformity with the commitment expressed in the letter of 23 January 1999 from the President of the Central African Republic to the Secretary-General;

15. Urges Member States to support financially and materially the restructuring programme of the FACA so as to facilitate its prompt implementation, and expresses its appreciation to those that have already done so;

16. Emphasizes that economic rehabilitation and reconstruction constitute important tasks facing the Government and people of the Central African Republic and that significant international assistance is indispensable for sustainable development in the Central African Republic, stresses the commitment of the international community to a long-term programme of support for the Central African Republic and further urges the Economic and Social Council, UNDP, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the appropriate regional financial institutions to contribute to the designing of such a programme;

17. Requests the Secretary-General to consider, in keeping with the statement of its President of 29 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/38), what role the United Nations might play in the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building in the Central African Republic, and further requests him, in consultation with the Government of the Central African Republic, to submit recommendations in this regard by 31 May 1999 on a possible United Nations presence in the Central African Republic after the 15 November 1999 termination of MINURCA;

18. Requests the Secretary-General to submit by 15 April 1999 and every 45 days thereafter a report on the implementation of the mandate of MINURCA, on developments in the Central African Republic, in particular on the election process, on progress towards the implementation of the commitments expressed in the letters of 8 January 1998 and of 23 January 1999 from the President of the Central African Republic to the Secretary-General and on the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the National Reconciliation Pact, including on commitments related to ensuring the country's economic recovery, the restructuring of the security forces and the functioning of the FORSDIR;

19. Commends the efforts of the Special Representative and the personnel of MINURCA to promote peace and national reconciliation in the Central African Republic;

20. Recalls the urgent need for Member States to contribute voluntarily to the trust fund established by the Secretary-General to support the activities of MINURCA;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/123
8 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to write to you with reference to document S/1999/25 concerning the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration, in particular paragraphs 7, 8 and 9.

In this regard, Egypt requests that the following items be retained on the above-mentioned list: items 1, 12, 17 and 20.

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nabil ELARABY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-03229 (E) 080299

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/124
8 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1206 (1998) of 12 November 1998. It brings up to date the record of developments in Tajikistan and the activities of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) since my last report of 3 November 1998 (S/1998/1029).

II. MAIN DEVELOPMENTS

2. The implementation of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan saw further slow progress in the period under review. At the time of my last report, the Tajik Parliament was preparing to convene its regular session. On 13 November, it adopted the law on political parties and approved the cabinet appointments of the representatives of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which had been rejected at the previous session (see S/1998/754, paras. 1-6). The Parliament also ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights along with the Optional Protocol.

3. In November 1998, President Emomali Rakhmonov established a joint working group to verify the state of completion of the first two stages of the protocol on military issues. The group presented its findings to the plenary Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR) and, based on that report, on 23 November, Abdullo Nuri, UTO leader and CNR Chairman, formally announced to CNR that the first two stages of the protocol could not be considered completed. The main issues were, as previously reported (S/1998/374, para. 6), that many UTO fighters do not stay in the assembly areas and only a limited number of weapons were registered and stored. This problem has still not been resolved.

4. On 25 December 1998, Mr. Nuri formally declared the return of all UTO fighters to Tajikistan and the closing of all its bases outside the country. He further pledged, on 28 December, that the UTO would disband its military forces in early 1999, in accordance with the General Agreement, to pave the way for the lifting of the ban on UTO political parties. According to the military

protocol, armed units that do not cooperate with its provisions will be considered illegal and subject to forcible disarmament.

5. On 5 January 1999, CNR issued a formal resolution which recognized that UTO had not fully complied with the provisions of the military protocol and called for all UTO fighters to return to their assembly areas and place their weapons in the designated storage areas. The resolution also called for stricter control over the carrying of weapons by UTO fighters outside the assembly areas. That resolution was preceded by a serious incident, on 30 December, in which two opposition groups engaged in a firefight outside the CNR building in Dushanbe, killing five persons and injuring six. Mr. Nuri has condemned the action of the two groups. At the same time, he has expressed concern over the slow pace of integration of the UTO fighters into the power structure, which contributed to the problem of discipline in the UTO ranks.

6. The Joint Central Review Commission, set up under stage III of the protocol, continued its work; it has so far reviewed 225 fighters in Gorno-Badakshan and 1,084 fighters in Kofarnikhon, Leninsky and Dushanbe, in addition to personnel of various government power structures.

7. In the allocation of government posts to UTO, in accordance with the 30 per cent quota, some progress was made. On 28 November, President Rakhmonov agreed to allocate an additional six posts to UTO, at the level of deputy minister. On 27 January, UTO presented the list of UTO nominees to these posts to the Government. No agreement was reached on the appointment of the Minister of Defence.

8. Full implementation of the amnesty law, adopted in August 1997, is still pending.

9. In public statements at the beginning of the new year, President Rakhmonov declared his Government's intention to hold a referendum on amendments to the constitution, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections in 1999, and called on the international community to provide financial assistance in this regard. Mr. Nuri has publicly expressed his support. (President Rakhmonov's five-year term ends in November 1999; the term of the current Parliament expires in February 2000.)

10. Under the General Agreement, primary responsibility for assisting in the holding of elections is given to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to the United Nations. OSCE and UNMOT are in close touch on the matter and are discussing with the Government the role that international organizations might play. In order to adhere to their stated intentions to carry out a referendum and elections this year, the parties would need to reach early agreement on issues related to constitutional reform. CNR has not made progress in its debate and has agreed to set aside, for the time being, the most contentious issue, which is the retention of the provision in the constitution that describes the character of the State as "secular".

11. The November session of Parliament was held against a backdrop of heightened tension in the country. On 3 November 1998, a force led by Mahmud Khudoiberdiev launched an offensive in Leninabad Province, the largest

and most prosperous region of the country. (Mr. Khudoiberdiev is a former army colonel who has been mentioned in previous reports in connection with anti-Government activities in the Khatlon Province, from which he was ousted in August 1997.) His force took control of Khujand, the main city and provincial capital, including the airport, and the mountain pass in the south linking the province with the rest of the country. A number of demands were made, including a share in the Government.

12. This use of force was strongly condemned in statements by CNR, UTO and the Contact Group of guarantor States and international organizations. In my own statement on 5 November 1998, I expressed firm opposition to this action and called on those concerned to pursue their aims by peaceful means so that the peace process in Tajikistan can be safeguarded. The Security Council was kept informed of these events and the President of the Council, in a statement to the press, expressed the Council's concern at the fighting and reaffirmed its commitment to the Tajik peace agreements.

13. On 6 November 1998, the Government began a counter-offensive, in which UTO joined. By 10 November, the Government had retaken control of the Province. Mr. Khudoiberdiev's whereabouts is unknown; it is believed that he has left the country. According to the Government, casualties amounted to 110 killed, almost half of them civilians, and 600 wounded.

14. It is widely believed that the force entered Leninabad Province from Uzbekistan, and this has affected relations between the two countries. On 12 November 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan issued a statement accusing the Uzbek authorities in having assisted Mr. Khudoiberdiev in preparing for the attack. The Tajik Parliament, at its session on 13 November, appealed to international organizations to take measures "to prevent future possibilities of aggression and interference by Uzbekistan in Tajikistan". On 13 November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan issued a statement firmly denying any involvement. Uzbekistan has recalled its Chargé d'affaires from Dushanbe on grounds of security, and its participation in the Contact Group has been suspended. Since then, however, both Governments have undertaken steps to improve their relations.

Security

15. The security situation in Tajikistan continued to be precarious. There was a noticeable increase in crime, in particular crime related to drug trafficking, and numerous violent incidents with possible political background. On 17 December 1998, a vehicle belonging to a foreign non-governmental organization came under fire from armed soldiers in Leninabad Province. One passenger was seriously wounded. In addition to the firefight in front of the CNR building on 30 December, there were a number of incidents involving opposition groups. On 5 January 1999, four farm workers were killed in the Darvaz region of Gorno-Badakshan in a raid by opposition commanders. On 30 January, eight opposition fighters were arrested by government servicemen at a checkpoint in the Faizabad district. The next day, according to the Government, about 300 opposition fighters took over the office of the Ministry of Interior in Faizabad, severely beat up its personnel, stole several weapons and freed the eight people who had

been arrested. A joint commission set up by the Government and UTO is investigating this incident.

16. Despite numerous démarches by UNMOT with the authorities and with UTO, no progress was made in the investigation into the killing of the four UNMOT personnel on 20 July 1998. The three suspects have not yet been brought to trial, awaiting material evidence to be turned over by UTO. UNMOT continues to observe strict security precautions, including a night-time curfew, and works only in Dushanbe.

United Nations activities

17. UNMOT continued to work closely with CNR to press forward on matters related to the implementation of the military protocol and constitutional reform. It also maintained contact with political groups outside CNR. UNMOT continued to coordinate the work of the Contact Group of guarantor States and international organizations in its efforts to facilitate the implementation of the General Agreement. In early January, the Contact Group undertook a review of the peace process and issued, on 13 January, a statement in which it urged the parties to take expeditious action to implement the remaining important tasks. The Contact Group recently revisited the idea of holding a meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers (see S/1998/754, para. 17 and S/1998/1029, para. 8).

18. UNMOT maintained contact with the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and remained in touch with the Russian border forces on matters of mutual concern.

19. The World Food Programme expressed its willingness to support projects related to the demobilization of UTO fighters, in the context of the implementation of the General Agreement. As a first step, it has agreed to provide two months supply of food to those fighters and to work towards a programme in the framework of its ongoing "food for work" programme.

20. The return of refugees from neighbouring countries continued with the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). By the end of January, approximately 3,000 refugees had been repatriated from Turkmenistan and 1,140 from the Kyrgyz Republic. The United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Office for Project Services, the United Nations Children's Fund, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and several non-governmental organizations assisted in the reintegration of returnees in their communities and intensified their efforts in the field of rehabilitation of rural schools, health clinics, water supply systems, irrigation schemes and other essential infrastructures, as well as the supply of educational materials, essential medical supplies and chemicals for water purification. A consolidated appeal for Tajikistan was launched in Geneva on 16 December 1998, for a total of $24.8 million for 1999, to address expected humanitarian and rehabilitation needs.

21. The United Nations International Drug Control Programme has decided to allocate, in 1999, $8 million for the reinforcement of the so-called anti-drug safety zone around Afghanistan.

III. OBSERVATIONS

22. There has been further slow progress in the peace process and a great deal remains yet to be done. The first two stages foreseen in the protocol on military issues have still not been completed and the extended debate of constitutional issues in CNR is ongoing. At the present stage, the holding of the constitutional referendum, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections, all to be held in 1999, remain uncertain. The risk inherent in the slow pace is the growing restlessness among the groups that are not direct parties to the peace agreement and to its power-sharing arrangements, as well as among the UTO fighters, who are awaiting reintegration into the Tajik army or demobilization. It is necessary to speed up the implementation of the process. Mr. Ján Kubiš, my Special Representative, and the members of the Contact Group are working with the parties to this end.

23. The transition period of 12 to 18 months foreseen in the peace agreement elapsed at the end of 1998, as has been acknowledged by the Tajik parties as well as by the Contact Group. The latter has again begun to consider the holding of a meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers. Such a meeting in support of the peace process could indeed be useful, if properly prepared.

24. I remain concerned by the precarious security situation in Tajikistan and with the fact that UTO has not contributed more effectively to the investigation of the killing of four members of UNMOT in July 1998. In the prevailing circumstances, UNMOT has continued to limit its activities to Dushanbe and to observe strict security precautions. I shall continue to keep the Security Council informed of any significant developments.

وزع بعثة مراقبي الأمم المتحدة في طاجيكستان
اعتبارا من شباط/فبراير ١٩٩٩
1999 年 2 月联塔观察团的部署情况
UNMOT DEPLOYMENT AS OF FEBRUARY 1999
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA MONUT EN FÉVRIER 1999
РАЗМЕЩЕНИЕ МНООНТ НА ФЕВРАЛЬ 1999
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNMOT EN FEBRERO 1999
KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
CHINA
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
LENINABAD
KUHISTONI BADAKHSHON
(GORNIY BADAKSHAN)
KHATLON
Tashkent
Angren
Taboshar
Syr Darya
Kokand
Khujand
(Leninabad)
Kanibadam
Bekabad
Kayrakkum
Reservoir
Chkalovsk
Isfara
Uroteppa
Samarkand
Shahriostan
Panjakent
Ayni
Zeravshan
Hoit
Jirgatal'
Tajikabad
Sangimaliki
Navabad
Garm
Surkhob
Lake Karakul'
Ragnau
Obikhingou
Lairon
Labijar
Childara
Wakhio
Romit
Magnurud
Faizabad
Obigarm
Tavildara
Sagirdasht
Kalaikhum
Kargovad
Vanj
Kudara
Rangkul'
Murgab
Lake Sarezskoye
Bartang
Murgab
Kalot
Rushan
Buved
Vir
Dzhartyrabot
Shaymak
Khorugh
Oksu
Pamir
Panj
Vrang
Kazidi
Ishkashim
Feyzabad
Kulob
(Kulyab)
Shuroabad
Moskovskiy
Kalininabad
Qurghonteppa
(Kurgan-Tyube)
Kolkhozabad
Kabodion
Nizhniy
Panj
Shaartuz
Shir Khan
Bandar
Termez
Amu Darya
Kafirnigan
Surkhan Darya
Dushanbe
HQ
Tursunzade
Shakhrinau
Kofarnikhon
Hisor
(Gissar)
Leninski
Nurek
Nurek
Reservoir
Khovaling
Vakhsh
Yakhsa
Dangara
Qubodiyon
Obigarm
Romit
Magnurud
Faizabad
Childara
Labijar
Lairon
Wakhio
Tavildara
Sagirdasht
Kalaikhum
Kargovad
Vanj
Kudara
Rangkul'

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/125
4 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the English translation of two notes verbales, dated 21 October 1998 and 12 January 1999, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran concerning the unlawful seizure of an Iranian cargo boat and detention of its crew of 11 Iranian nationals in the Persian Gulf by Iraqi military forces (see annexes).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annexes were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hadi NEJAD-HOSSEINIAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-03273 (E) 090299

/...

Annex I

Note verbale dated 21 October 1998 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran and has the honour to state the following:

Relevant Iranian authorities have reported that, on 10 September 1998 at 1100 hours, Iraqi forces seized an Iranian cargo boat, with the motor registration number 15636, which was on its routine and traditional route to Kuwait around Khur Abd-Allah before Bubian island, and transferred all 11 members of the crew to an unknown place.

The names and particulars of the crew are as follows:

		Seamanship ID Number
1.	Qasem Halafi Dousari	(captain) 0115004
2.	Karim Hayati	(crew) 0200684
3.	Majid Mansouri	(crew) 0110314
4.	Seead Fakher Purshebar Hashemi	(crew) 0109432
5.	Abud Ajman	(crew) 0115278
6.	Rahim Khalafi Dousari	(crew) 0131937
7.	Hasan Khademi	(crew) 0123078
8.	Yaqub Khamisi	(crew) 0114375
9.	Abd-al-Zahra Khalafi Dousari	(crew) 0113651
10.	Ali Halafi Dousari	(crew) 0119692
11.	Karim Khalafi Dousari	(crew) 012076

While expressing its strong objection to this irresponsible act by the Iraqi military forces in capturing Iranian nationals, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphatically requests that the Government of the Republic of Iraq promptly release the above-mentioned Iranian nationals, and that it provide the necessary training and instruction to its military forces to comply with international rules and principles and avoid any action which would disturb order and security in the region and disrupt the safety of navigation in the Persian Gulf.

It would be highly appreciated if that Embassy would report this issue to the relevant authorities of the Government of the Republic of Iraq as soon as possible, and subsequently inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran of the result.

Annex II

Note verbale dated 12 January 1999 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran and, pursuant to the note verbale dated 21 October 1998, concerning the seizure of an Iranian cargo boat and the arrest of its crew of 11, has the honour to state the following:

In spite of the continuous efforts of this Ministry and the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Baghdad, regrettably the relevant authorities of the Government of the Republic of Iraq have neither taken any measures to release the Iranian seamen and their boat, nor have they officially announced the reason for taking them into custody.

Once again, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its objection to such acts which contravene the customary and treaty principles of international navigation, and emphatically requests that the Government of the Republic of Iraq take immediate measures to release the Iranian nationals and their boat and to compensate the damages incurred.

The responsibility for such acts should naturally be borne by the Government of the Republic of Iraq and they will impact negatively on the process of normalization of relations between the two countries.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/126
8 February 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURKINA FASO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the statement by the Current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity regarding the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Michel KAFANDO

99-03267 (E) 080299 080299

/...

Annex

Statement issued on 6 February 1999 by the Current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity concerning the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea

On 17 December 1998, the Central Organ of the Mechanism of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution met at Ouagadougou at the level of heads of State and Government.

Its agenda included the question of the unfortunate dispute between two fraternal States, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The heads of State and Government, after having considered the report of the High-level OAU Delegation on the dispute, welcomed the commendable efforts made by the delegation with a view to promoting a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the dispute.

They also took note of the positions expressed by the two parties regarding the High-level Delegation's proposals and commended both of them for their cooperation with the delegation in carrying out its mission and for the restraint which they have displayed over many long months.

Today, the deterioration in the situation along the borders of Ethiopia and Eritrea is for us a source of the greatest and deepest concern.

It would be extremely unfortunate if this situation were to get out of control while the Organization of African Unity, with the valuable assistance of the United Nations and the international community, is pursuing efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute.

I should therefore like, on behalf of the Organization of African Unity, to reiterate to both parties and particularly to their leaders, the appeal which the fourth summit meeting of the Central Organ made to them at Ouagadougou on 17 December 1998 to continue to cooperate with the High-level Delegation with a view to creating the necessary conditions for the rapid implementation of the framework agreement that was submitted to them and to continue to exercise restraint.

I should like to assure the two fraternal countries of Ethiopia and Eritrea that the Delegation, which continues to consider their dispute, remains convinced that the channels leading to a peaceful settlement have not been exhausted.

Accordingly, I solemnly and urgently appeal to them to continue to trust in Africa and the international community by putting an immediate and unconditional end to the hostilities that have recently resumed along their borders.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/127
9 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 8 February 1999, from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-03384 (E) 090299

/...

Annex

Letter dated 8 February 1999 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to the note by the President of the Security Council, document S/1999/100, dated 30 January 1999, and would be grateful if you could arrange to transmit to the President of the Security Council the attached report, which may be helpful in facilitating the work of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues arising from Security Council resolutions on Iraq (see appendix).

(Signed) Mohamed ELBARADEI

Appendix

Letter dated 8 February 1999 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to the note by the President of the Security Council, document S/1999/100, dated 30 January 1999, regarding, inter alia, the establishment of a panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues arising from its resolutions related to Iraq, I attach a brief report on the status of implementation of the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq, which may be helpful in facilitating the work of the panel. The report also includes a summary of the purpose, measures and costs of implementation of the IAEA plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The main body of information on IAEA activities in Iraq is contained in progress reports to the Security Council, in particular document S/1997/779, dated 8 October 1997, and all subsequent reports.

I and my staff remain available to provide such additional information as you or Council members may require.

(Signed) Mohamed ELBARADEI

Enclosure

Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues (S/1999/100)

INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarises the status of implementation by the IAEA of its mandate in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolutions. It includes an examination of the remaining questions and concerns and their impact on the completeness of the IAEA's technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme and on the IAEA's technical ability to fully implement its OMV plan. The report also includes a summary description of the purpose and technical activities of the OMV plan and provides additional information on the estimated direct costs of implementation of the plan.

SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA MANDATE IN IRAQ

2. The October 1997 progress report to the Security Council, document S/1997/779, dated 8 October 1997, included a comprehensive summary of the IAEA's activities with respect to its mandate in Iraq under resolution 687 (1991) over the period since the coming into force of that resolution, on 3 April 1991. The report, and its attachments, included the salient information on: the IAEA's inspection results; the actions taken to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons assets; and the indicated status of those assets in October 1997.

3. The fundamental statement included in the report was that the extensive inspection activities undertaken by the IAEA had resulted in a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme covering the stages from the production and procurement of natural uranium compounds, through Iraq's development of enrichment processes, to the design and experimental work for the eventual weaponisation of highly enriched uranium. The report also included statements, reproduced in annex 1 to this present report, to the effect that Iraq's programme had been very well funded and was aimed at the development and production of a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, but that there were no indications that Iraq had achieved its programme objective, or produced or otherwise acquired any meaningful amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material. The report additionally included statements to the effect that there were no indications that Iraq had retained the physical capability (facilities and hardware) to be able to produce weapon-usable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance. The report also stressed that "no indication" of prohibited items or activities was not the same as their "non existence".

4. The report also cautioned that, despite the scope and intensity of the verification measures, a degree of uncertainty is inevitable in any countrywide verification process that seeks to prove the absence of readily concealable or disguisable objects and activities. In this context, the report listed five matters, reproduced in annex 2, whose resolution would contribute to a reduction in the residual uncertainty.

5. Since October 1997, IAEA reporting to the Security Council has included statements on progress in the resolution of those five matters and the significance of the remaining questions and concerns. Document S/1998/38, dated 15 January 1998, recorded that Iraq had provided to the IAEA the requested information regarding its post-war procurement procedures. Similarly, document S/1998/312, dated 9 April 1998, recorded that Iraq had provided to the

IAEA a document summarising the technical achievements of its clandestine nuclear programme and that the IAEA regarded the summary information to be consistent with the technically coherent picture of that programme.

6. Document S/1998/694, dated 27 July 1998, prepared in response to Presidential statement S/PRST/1998/11, dated 14 May 1998, addressed all outstanding questions and concerns regarding Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme with particular regard to their impact on the IAEA's ability to implement fully its ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) plan approved under resolution 715 (1991).

7. Document S/1998/927, dated 7 October 1998, identified three areas where questions and concerns remain, namely:

a. the lack of certain technical documentation - specifically Iraq's stated inability to provide relevant engineering design drawings of the nuclear weapon and its principal components, or details of models. Additionally, very few of the original gas centrifuge design drawings Iraq obtained from foreign assistance have been handed over to the IAEA.

b. external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme – specifically Iraq's stated inability to provide further information regarding the identification and location of a foreign national alleged to have offered assistance in nuclear weapon design, in nuclear-weapon usable material production and in the procurement of critical components and materials.

c. Iraq's abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme – specifically Iraq's stated inability to provide documentation showing the timing and modalities of that abandonment. Furthermore, it was recorded that Iraq had not yet adopted measures or enacted penal laws to enforce national compliance with Iraq's obligation not to acquire, develop or retain, nuclear weapons, weapon-

usable nuclear material or related assets, as required by paragraph 34 of the IAEA OMV plan, approved under Security Council resolution 715 (1991).

8. That same document included a statement that "the uncertainties resulting from the above questions and concerns would not, of themselves, prevent the full implementation of the IAEA OMV plan".

REMAINING QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS

The lack of certain technical documentation

9. Enclosure 1 to Document S/1997/779 included a description of a range of technical documentation whose absence impacted on the completeness of the information on Iraq's weaponisation activities. Since that time the IAEA has obtained from Iraq a document which, although largely duplicating information received by the IAEA in October 1995, also included other records which support Iraq's earlier statement of the progress made in the development of the explosive package for the nuclear weapon. As a result, the only significant category of weaponisation documentation still missing comprises engineering drawings detailing the nuclear weapon design options and its principal components, as well as the corresponding models. Iraq has, on several occasions, declared its inability to provide this remaining documentation and has further stated that its weapon development had not reached the stage where the production of models and detailed engineering drawings would have been necessary. To compensate for this uncertainty the OMV plan is predicated upon the assumption that Iraq has acquired the technical ability to fabricate an implosion-type fission-based nuclear weapon.

10. In the area of uranium enrichment, it is established that Iraq obtained a large number of drawings of gas centrifuge enrichment machines from foreign sources of assistance which it used as the basis of its design and development

programme. The IAEA has only been provided with a few of these original drawings and those were of little technical significance. The completeness of the IAEA's understanding of Iraq's centrifuge development capabilities would be enhanced through the recovery of the remainder of the drawings. However, since the IAEA has assessed as credible Iraq's claim to have successfully developed and tested a single cylinder sub-critical centrifuge machine which could have been exploited to produce highly enriched uranium in weapon-significant amounts, the recovery of the drawings would do little to change the assessment of Iraq's capabilities in this area.

11. It is similarly established that the drawings obtained from foreign sources of assistance included details of a high-capacity super-critical multi-cylinder centrifuge machine whose exploitation would have greatly enhanced Iraq's enriched uranium production capacity. However, the IAEA considers Iraq's statement of having done little work of any significance to develop designs for these advanced machines, to be consistent with the relatively limited time and resources that Iraq could have assigned to this additional development project.

The extent of external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme

12. A collection of correspondence between the Iraqi General Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat) and Department 3000 of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, which later became PC-3, was contained in the so-called Haider House Farm cache of documentation. Part of this collection related to the relatively minor use of a Mukhabarat front company for clandestine procurement and has been clarified in discussion with the Iraqi counterpart. However, also included in that collection of correspondence was a series of letters relating to an approach by a foreign national, apparently received around October 1990, offering to provide, for financial reward, assistance and information on nuclear weapon design, weapon-usable nuclear material production and the procurement of critical components and materials.

13. After initial protracted reluctance to recall the offer, the Iraqi counterpart provided some additional detail to that included in the correspondence. This additional information was, however, not sufficient for the IAEA to be able to identify and locate the foreign national alleged to have made the offer. Throughout the discussions the Iraqi counterpart consistently maintained that it had not taken any advantage of the offer and stated its opinion that the risk of exposure of its clandestine programme far outweighed probability of benefiting from such offers.

14. The IAEA holds no evidence to contradict Iraq's statement but considers that it is important to continue to ask for Iraq's assistance in attempting to identify and locate the foreign national involved.

Iraq's abandonment of its nuclear weapons programme

15. In order to attempt to compensate for uncertainty in the completeness of the technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, the IAEA sought to obtain from the Iraqi counterpart, documentary evidence of Iraq's formal abandonment of that programme, its timing and modalities. This IAEA initiative started in the second half of 1996 and resulted in the provision by Iraq of a collection of orders and decrees indicating that many of the organisations associated with PC-3 had been assigned new missions. The most significant of these documents was an order indicating that PC-3 itself had been dissolved as an entity in the first half of 1992 and that its financial assets and ongoing liabilities were to be re-assigned to other organisations.

16. The documents were helpful and, in a secondary sense, supported Iraq's statement that its clandestine nuclear programme had been abandoned. On the other hand, they did not include a decree or any other document recording a formal governmental decision to abandon the programme.

17. The Iraqi counterpart insists that no document exists, be it decree or any other form of record, registering the formal abandonment of its clandestine nuclear programme. Indeed the counterpart argues that, had such a document existed, it would clearly be in their best interests to provide it to the IAEA. The logic of the argument is sound provided that any such record would have registered a decision taken no later than mid-1991. There can be no doubt that a verifiable record of such vintage registering Iraq's timely abandonment would reduce the significance of the uncertainty associated with the completeness of the coherent picture of Iraq's programme. Notwithstanding the existence or non-existence of such documentation, it is clear that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligation to adopt measures and enact penal laws, to implement and enforce compliance with Iraq's obligations under resolutions 687 and 707, other relevant Security Council resolutions and the IAEA OMV plan, as required under paragraph 34 of that plan.

Impact of uncertainties on the full implementation of the OMV plan

18. The IAEA's possession of the additional information, referred to in paragraphs 9-17, would certainly add to the completeness of the picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding Iraq's achievements in weaponisation and centrifuge enrichment technology. However, its continued absence would have no significant effect on the technical basis of the IAEA OMV plan, nor would it impede the full implementation of that plan.

ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

Purpose and technical activities

19. The IAEA interim status report of 27 July 1998 (S/1998/694) recalled that the purpose of its OMV plan is to monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its

obligations under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), primarily, Iraq's obligation not to acquire, develop or retain nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or any related production capability.

20. The OMV plan is thus designed to provide timely detection of indications of any attempt by Iraq to reconstitute its clandestine nuclear programme, or more specifically, to give assurance of the absence of prohibited equipment, materials and activities. The plan takes fully into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding the production of weapon-usable nuclear material. The OMV plan also takes into account the uncertainties referred to in the previous section of this report and is predicated on the assumption that Iraq retains the capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant material or technology to which it may gain access in the future.

21. As the task of the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of Iraq's prohibited nuclear assets was nearing completion during the second half of 1992, work began on the phasing-in of the IAEA OMV plan. The plan was considered to be operational in August 1994 with the establishment of the IAEA's continuous presence in Iraq through its Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG). Since that time, work has continued to increase the scope and technology of OMV measures which has led, over time, to corresponding increases in the personnel resources of the NMG.

22. Effective ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, as required by resolution 687 (1991), must be comprehensive and rigorous and, as a result, is intrusive. The effectiveness of the IAEA OMV plan is critically dependent upon the full exercise of the rights of access enshrined in the plan. Any diminution of, or interference with, those rights directly impacts on the ability of the IAEA to provide the necessary level of assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations.

23. The procedures and techniques initially employed by the IAEA to map out Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme were designed to detect the presence of prohibited equipment, materials and activities. The IAEA has employed essentially the same procedures and techniques under its OMV plan, which is designed to provide assurance of the absence of prohibited equipment, materials and activities.

24. These procedures and techniques include, but are not limited to: unannounced inspections of known locations; unannounced inspections of previously un-inspected locations; examination of records, equipment, materials and products; sampling of materials and work surfaces; interviews of personnel in the workplace; overhead imagery analysis; and environmental monitoring, including aerial and land-based radiation surveys, hydrological sampling, vegetation sampling, air sampling and deposition sampling. These practical measures are complemented by the following up of information derived from the results of inspections, from analysis of Iraqi documentation, from publicly available information and other information provided by Member States. The IAEA will, in the future, make use of any other verification technology that could facilitate the fulfilment of its mandate.

25. The measures to be implemented under the OMV plan must not only provide credible assurance of the absence of prohibited equipment, materials and activities at routinely inspected locations, but must also provide a significant probability of detecting prohibited equipment, materials or activities at other locations. Thus, the OMV plan must incorporate a comprehensive search capability designed to detect signs of prohibited activities being carried out at locations that are not routinely monitored. A critical component of this capability is, therefore, the carrying out unannounced inspections at new sites. It was to strengthen further this search capability that the IAEA embarked upon a programme of expansion and consolidation of a number of its field activities into a wide-area environmental monitoring programme.

Estimated costs of long-term implementation

26. The IAEA interim status report of 27 July 1998 (S/1998/694) recorded that, as a result of seeking the maximum assistance in cash and kind from all Member States, the IAEA had been able to limit its average annual direct expenditure to some three million US dollars. In this context, it is relevant to record that, since it began the implementation of its mandate in April 1991, supporting Member States have provided, without cost to the IAEA, technical expert resources, equipment and sample analysis/evaluation services worth tens of millions of US dollars. Taking into account these services and the costs of the planned wide-area environmental monitoring programme (personnel resources, equipment, sample processing and analysis, data evaluation and data management), the estimated total annual direct cost of implementing the IAEA OMV plan will be of the order of nine million US dollars. It was also explained that the estimate of nine million US dollars did not include the substantial costs of logistical and other assistance provided by the Special Commission, such as medical services and emergency evacuation, communications, office and laboratory accommodation, aeroplane and helicopter transport and road vehicle transport.

27. On the assumption that the IAEA will resume the implementation of its mandate in Iraq it is assessed that effective implementation of the OMV plan will require the continuous presence in Iraq of the Nuclear Monitoring Group, comprising up to eight technical staff and one or two administrative support personnel, supplemented, from time to time, with additional technical staff as specific monitoring tasks may require.

28. In accordance with the above, a more detailed budget assessment has been completed which estimates the total annual direct cost of implementing the IAEA OMV plan to be almost ten million US dollars per year, again not including

the costs of logistical support provided through the Special Commission. A summary of this assessment is included in Annex 3 to this report.

Status of IAEA verification in Iraq

29. As is well known, the IAEA has been unable to fulfil its mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions since its departure from Iraq on 16 December 1998. As a consequence the IAEA is, at this time, unable to give any measure of assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under the relevant resolutions. This report can therefore only reflect the situation existing up to 16 December 1998.

SUMMARY

30. The IAEA's current inability to implement its mandate in Iraq, under the relevant Security Council resolutions, renders it unable to provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. To be able to implement its mandate and particularly to reinstate continuity of knowledge of Iraq's nuclear-related assets, it is essential that the IAEA return to Iraq as soon as possible.

31. The IAEA's extensive verification activities in Iraq, since May 1991, have yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. These verification activities have revealed no indication that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material, or that Iraq has retained any practical capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material.

32. However, there is an inevitable degree of uncertainty in any countrywide verification process that seeks to prove the absence of readily concealable or

disguisable items or activities. It is this uncertainty which makes it essential for ongoing monitoring and verification to be a continuous process. Nonetheless, the IAEA, despite its extensive verification measures, cannot provide absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealable items, such as components of centrifuge machines or copies of weapon-related documentation. Similarly, it should be recognised that verification measures cannot guarantee detection of readily concealable or disguisable proscribed activities, such as computer-based weaponisation studies, explosives experimentation or small-scale centrifuge cascade development. A statement by the IAEA that it has found "no indication" of prohibited equipment, materials or activities in Iraq is not the same as a statement of their "non existence". It is for this reason that the OMV plan takes into account the prudent assumption that Iraq has retained documentation of its clandestine nuclear programme, specimens of important components and possibly amounts of non-enriched uranium. It is similarly assumed that Iraq retains the capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future.

33. Resolution of the few remaining questions and concerns described in paragraphs 9 – 17 above would undoubtedly contribute to the confidence in the completeness of the technically coherent picture. However, Iraq has consistently stated that it is unable to provide any further information or documentation. In this latter regard, Iraq states that much of the requested documentation never existed and that which did exist had been unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in 1991 and 1992. The IAEA holds no credible information to confirm or refute Iraq's statements.

34. The uncertainty deriving from the few remaining questions and concerns does not present any technical impediment to the full implementation of the IAEA's OMV plan, which takes into account those uncertainties. Provided that it is able to exercise its right to full and free access in Iraq, the IAEA is in a position to proceed with the full implementation of its OMV plan and, as part of that plan, to investigate further the remaining questions and concerns and any other aspect of Iraq's

clandestine nuclear programme arising out of new information acquired by the IAEA.

35. The scope of the activities to be carried out within the frame of the OMV plan is based upon the technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and remaining uncertainties are compensated for by prudent assumptions regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities. These assumptions, as for example, the assumption that Iraq has the capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future, are based on logical assessment rather than clear indications to that effect.

36. It is estimated that the annual direct costs of full implementation of the IAEA OMV plan will be in the region of ten million US dollars, not including the substantial costs of logistical and other assistance provided through the Special Commission. Arrangements for the resumption of the IAEA's activities in Iraq should take into consideration the need for long-term funding of those activities.

Annex 1 Abstracts from document S/1997/779

The scope and *status* of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme

71. The results of the IAEA's on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities have, over time produced a picture of a very well funded programme aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapons-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon.

72. The programme, which is described in greater detail in Attachment 1 to document S/1997/779, comprised:

- indigenous production and overt and covert procurement of natural uranium compounds. In this regard:

  All known indigenous facilities capable of production of amounts of uranium compounds useful to a reconstituted nuclear programme have been destroyed along with their principal equipment.

  All known procured uranium compounds are in the custody of the IAEA.

  All known practically recoverable amounts of indigenously produced uranium compounds are in the custody of the IAEA.

- industrial-scale facilities for the production of pure uranium compounds suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment. In this regard:

  All known facilities for the industrial-scale production of pure uranium compounds suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment have been destroyed, along with their principal equipment.

- research and development of the full range of enrichment technologies culminating in the industrial-scale exploitation of EMIS and substantial progress towards similar exploitation of gas centrifuge enrichment technology. In this regard:

  All known single-use equipment used in the research and development of enrichment technologies has been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless.

  All known dual-use equipment used in the research and development of enrichment technologies is subjected to ongoing monitoring and verification.

  All known facilities and equipment for the enrichment of uranium through EMIS technologies have been destroyed along with their principal equipment.

- design and feasibility studies for an indigenous plutonium production reactor. In this regard:

  IAEA inspections have revealed no indications that Iraq's plans for an indigenous plutonium production reactor proceeded beyond a feasibility study.

- research and development of irradiated fuel reprocessing technology. In this regard:

  The facility used for research and development of irradiated fuel reprocessing technology was destroyed in the bombardment of Tuwaitha

and the process-dedicated equipment has been destroyed or rendered harmless.

- research and development of weaponisation capabilities for implosion-based nuclear weapons. In this regard:

  The principal buildings of the Al Atheer nuclear weapons development and production plant have been destroyed and all known purpose-specific equipment has been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless.

- a "crash programme" aimed at diverting safeguarded research reactor fuel and recovering the HEU for use in a nuclear weapon. In this regard:

  The entire inventory of research reactor fuel was verified and accounted for by the IAEA and maintained under IAEA custody until it was removed from Iraq.

77. Although certain documentary evidence is missing and some gaps in knowledge remain, the following can be stated with regard to Iraq's clandestine programme:

    - There are no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalisation of a workable design for its nuclear weapons is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available programme documentation. However, no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of the weapon design when the programme was interrupted.

- Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon.

- There are no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more that a few grams of weapons-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes, all of which has been removed from Iraq.

- There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapons-usable nuclear material.

- All of the safeguarded research reactor fuel, including the HEU fuel that Iraq had planned to divert to its "crash programme", was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.

- There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.

79. There are no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which has evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in Iraq's FFCD-F issued on 7 September 1996 as supplemented by the written revisions and additions provided by Iraq since that time. However, taking into account the possibility, albeit remote, of undetected duplicate facilities or the existence of anomalous activities or facilities outside this technically coherent picture, no absolute assurances can be given with regard to the completeness of Iraq's FFCD. Some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical verification process which aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or activities. The extent to which such uncertainty is acceptable is a policy judgement.

80. Most of the IAEA activities involving the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of the components of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme which to date have been revealed and destroyed, were completed by the end of 1992 (See Attachment 3 to document S/1997/779). Since that time, only a relatively small number of items of proscribed equipment and materials have been identified and disposed of, most of which were handed over to the IAEA by Iraq since the events of August 1995. While no indications of the presence of further proscribed equipment or materials in Iraq have been found, the IAEA, despite its extensive inspection activities, cannot, for the reasons described in the previous paragraph, provide absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealable items, such as components of centrifuge machines or copies of weapons-related documentation.

82. Implementation of the OMV plan has not resulted in the detection of any indications of ongoing proscribed activities or the presence in Iraq of proscribed equipment or materials, apart from the items referred to in paragraph 80 above. It should be recognised, however, that OMV measures cannot guarantee detection of readily concealable or disguisable proscribed activities, such as computer-based weaponisation studies or small-scale centrifuge cascade development. Iraq's direct acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material would also present a severe technical challenge to the OMV measures and great reliance must be placed on international controls.

Annex 2 Re-presentation of paragraph 75 of document S/1997/779

"In connection with its technical team visits, since May 1997, the IAEA has received clarification of many matters raised with the Iraqi counterpart. While containing little new information, Iraq's written statements provided a helpful collation of previously reviewed information. In one critical area Iraq was able to provide copies of correspondence which, if genuine, provide strong corroboration of Iraq's description of the status, as of the end of 1990, of its work to develop explosive lenses. However, the Iraqi counterpart:

a. has not provided a comprehensive written statement of the membership, terms of reference and duration of authority of the Governmental Committee charged, inter alia, to "reduce the effect of NPT violation to the minimum";

b. has stated that it has no further information regarding external assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme;

c. has declared itself unable to describe the motives behind the actions ascribed to the late Lt. General Hussein Kamel which resulted in the concealment of the cache of documentation, material and equipment "discovered" at the Haider House farm;

d. has declined to include, in its FFCD a summary of the practical and theoretical achievements of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, and;

e. has yet to provide the promised written description of its post-war procurement system."

Note: Items a. and c. above were subsequently considered to be components of Iraq's abandonment of its clandestine nuclear programme, which is one of the remaining questions and concern.
Items d. and e. were subsequently satisfactorily resolved.

Annex 3 Iraq Action Team budget forecast

	1999	2,000
Staff costs - Action Team personnel	2,193,000	2,191,000
Staff costs- DSG personnel	640,000	640,000
Staff costs - member state experts (MSE)	1,060,000	1,060,000
Total staff costs	**3,893,000**	**3,891,000**
Travel costs HQ personnel to NMG	426,000	447,000
Travel costs - Member State experts to NMG	397,000	417,000
Travel costs - Member State specialists to NMG	361,000	379,000
Travel costs - HQ personnel to other locations	104,000	109,000
Total travel costs	**1,288,000**	**1,352,000**
Monitoring equipment NDA	500,000	525,000
WAEM equipment	850,000	893,000
WAEM sample analysis	1,227,000	1,288,000
WAEM data evaluation	500,000	525,000
WAEM SAL sample management	500,000	525,000
Total equipment / sample processing costs	**3,077,000**	**3,231,000**
Aerial radiation surveys	900,000	945,000
Total aerial radiation survey costs	**900,000**	**945,000**
Total supplies and miscellaneous services	**500,000**	**525,000**
Grand totals	**9,658,000**	**9,944,000**

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/128
8 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With my highest respects to you and members of the Security Council, I wish to present my Government's disappointment over the international impunity which is encouraging Ethiopia to indulge in dangerous military adventures with grave consequences.

Despite widespread international calls, including that of the Security Council, to refrain from the use of force in the Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute, the Ethiopian regime has continued to use force to violate Eritrean sovereignty and grab Eritrean territory. Despite Eritrea's consistent stand that the border dispute can and should be resolved by peaceful and legal means, and persistent calls for a ceasefire or cessation of all hostilities since the conflict erupted, the Ethiopian regime has continued to threaten and use war to dictate its will.

Unmindful of Eritrea's, and the international community's, assertion that force cannot solve the border dispute, the Ethiopian regime has persisted in its warpath, and once again, after a long lull, has launched a renewed offensive, on 5 February 1999.

The cause behind the military adventures of the Ethiopian regime in the past nine months is clearly the miscalculations and misconceptions that it entertained. Partial blame however rests with the international community. In this regard, the impunity with which Ethiopia's excesses have been tolerated has become a major factor in encouraging its adventures.

Indeed, while it was and remains known that the Tigre People's Liberation Front regime has:

Issued a new map of a "greater Tigray" by unilaterally and illegally redrawing the international boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia that is based on established colonial treaties;

Resorted to the repeated use of force to implement its dreams of territorial aggrandizement;

Escalated the conflict by launching the first air strike against Eritrea on 5 June 1998;

Continued to perpetrate unparalleled violations of the human rights of innocent Eritreans;

Announced time and again its intention of solving the dispute militarily;

Now unleashed the war that it has been threatening all along; a fact it has finally admitted after the usual ploy of counter-claims at the beginning;

Violated the air moratorium (by its own admission after initial fabrications that Eritrea bombed first) by employing its air force in its ongoing offensive;

The international community continues to maintain an unbalanced stance.

This unjustified position has resulted in rewarding the Ethiopian regime for all its acts of aggression and flagrant violations of fundamental principles. More gravely, impunity has obstructed peace, postponing an early resolution of the conflict. In the event, the Government of Eritrea calls on the international community to abandon its unbalanced stance and double standard and to shoulder its responsibilities. First and foremost, Ethiopia must be condemned for its continued irresponsible use of force to dictate its will.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the text of the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Haile MENKERIOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/129
9 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to inform you of the most recent ruthless attacks against innocent civilians in Kosovo and Metohija that have taken place in the last couple of days. The most drastic examples have been the killings of 17-year-old Sabahed Zeka and 20-year-old Xhemail Smaqi, whose bodies were found at the outskirts of Djakovica. In addition, three other bodies have been found in Kosovo and Metohija. These acts of violence have also been condemned by all participants in the talks at Rambouillet, France.

To the great regret of my Government, these acts demonstrate the opposition of terrorists to a peaceful solution for Kosovo and Metohija and their desire to undermine the talks at Rambouillet and prevent an agreement from being achieved through dialogue.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia calls upon the Security Council once again to condemn terrorism, as well as the most recent terrorist acts against innocent civilians, and to support the efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful solution with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I would be very grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-03335 (E) 090299

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/130
11 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the question of the Western Sahara, and reaffirming in particular resolution 1204 (1998) of 30 October 1998 and resolution 1215 (1998) of 17 December 1998,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 28 January 1999 (S/1999/88) and the observations and recommendations contained therein,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 March 1999 to allow for consultations in the hope and expectation of agreement on the protocols on identification, appeals and repatriation planning activities, as well as on the essential issue of the implementation calendar, without undermining the integrity of the Secretary-General's proposed package or calling into question its main elements, for the prompt resumption of voter identification and initiation of the appeals process;

2. Requests both parties to take concrete action to enable the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to carry out the necessary preparatory work for the repatriation of Saharan refugees eligible to vote, and their immediate families, according to the Settlement Plan;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 22 March 1999 on the implementation of this resolution;

4. Supports the intention of the Secretary-General to ask his Personal Envoy to reassess the viability of the mandate of MINURSO should the prospects for putting the package of measures into effect remain elusive at the time of submission of the Secretary-General's next report;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

99-03627 (E) 110299

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/131
9 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you a statement by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on the current situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, issued on 8 February 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-03390 (E) 090299

/...

Annex

Statement by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on the current situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, issued on 8 February 1999

I wish to reiterate my deep concern over the current fighting between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces on their common border. I am particularly saddened by this unfortunate escalation, which has occurred at a time when sustained efforts are being deployed by our continental Organization and many other concerned parties within the international community aimed at promoting a peaceful solution to the dispute between these two countries.

I wish to urge both Eritrea and Ethiopia to immediately put an end to the current fighting and recommit themselves to a peaceful solution to the dispute. In this regard, I wish to underscore that the Framework Agreement submitted to the parties by the High-level Delegation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) remains a viable and sound framework for a peaceful solution to the dispute. This Framework Agreement was endorsed by the OAU Central Organ at the summit level, which called on the two Parties to continue to cooperate with the OAU High-level Delegation with a view to creating the necessary conditions for the speedy implementation of the Framework Agreement. The latter was also widely supported by the international community, which welcomed it and considered the proposals it contained as being fair and balanced. The OAU Framework Agreement was, in particular, strongly supported by the United Nations Security Council and the European Union.

I wish to reiterate the disposition of OAU and its High-level Delegation to continue to engage the parties to the dispute, on the basis of the Framework Agreement submitted to the two parties for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. In this regard and in order to advance the peace process, the OAU High-level Delegation awaits the response which the Eritrean side undertook to communicate to it after receiving the clarifications sought on elements of the Framework Agreement.

Finally, I wish to appeal to the leaders of both countries to exercise restraint, to abide by their commitment and to do everything in their power to avert a further escalation of the conflict, which can only cause more suffering, loss of lives and destruction of property and infrastructure, and further complicate the peace efforts.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/132
9 February 1999
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach a letter from President Ange-Félix Patassé of the Central African Republic on matters of concern to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambroisine KPONGO
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-03411 (E) 110299 110299

/...

Annex

Letter dated 9 February 1999 from the President of the Central African Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to attach some information that may be of use in assuaging the concerns of the members of the Security Council (see appendix).

I reaffirm that every effort will be made to maintain peace in the Central African Republic through dialogue and consensus-building.

(Signed) Ange-Félix PATASSÉ

Appendix

Letter dated 9 February 1999 from the President of the Central African Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my letters Nos. 143/98 PR of 8 December 1998 (S/1999/116, annex) and 001/99 PR of 23 January 1999 (S/1999/98, annex), addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I expressed the wish to see the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) extended until the presidential elections, which are scheduled to be held in 1999. This was in accordance with in my letter of 8 January 1998, in which I had requested the establishment of a United Nations mission to monitor both the legislative and the presidential elections.

My personal commitment and the Government's strong determination to consolidate the democratic process and strengthen the rule of law in the Central African Republic have enabled us, with the support of the Security Council, to hold the legislative elections in normal conditions and to the satisfaction of all.

In any case, the holding of free and transparent elections does not fully represent democracy. It does, however, constitute an especially important step in that process.

Similarly, a State under the rule of law, which by nature is respectful of international laws, rules and commitments, cannot be satisfied with an ongoing violation of these instruments for the sake of an absolute quest for consensus.

For these reasons, following the legislative elections, the implementation of the remainder of the Bangui Agreements must be accompanied by a formal return to constitutional legality.

Moreover, in view of the forthcoming withdrawal of MINURCA, which we hope will occur only after the 1999 presidential elections, it is important and urgent to encourage and prepare the Central African people to re-establish their commitment to the principle which guarantees the survival of any democracy, namely, respect for republican legality.

On the basis of the foregoing, and especially in view of its respect for the principle of the separation of powers, the Government notes and welcomes the fact that the three governing powers of democracy are functioning normally.

At the executive level

Pursuant to the provisions of article 21 of the Constitution and in the spirit of the Bangui Agreements, a Prime Minister from civil society formed a Government within two weeks, following consultations with the opposition, only one member of which agreed to participate. The members of this Government, who were chosen on the basis of their competence and integrity, are from civil society and the political parties.

On 1 February 1999, the new Prime Minister received a vote of confidence from the deputies. The National Assembly is now meeting to adopt the Budget Act for the fiscal year 1999.

At the jurisdictional and judicial level

At the jurisdictional and judicial level, all institutions are functioning normally with full independence. At present, the disputes arising from the last legislative elections are still pending before the Constitutional Court.

At the legislative level

Lastly, at the legislative level, despite the contradictions that plagued the work of the first special session devoted to the establishment of the Bureau of the National Assembly, the Assembly itself was functional. The parliamentary committees, a list of which is attached, are composed of deputies from both the Government and the opposition (see enclosure II).

As to the composition of the Bureau of the National Assembly, it should be recalled that all the members of this Bureau are elected and not appointed or decided on the basis of consensus, as they are in the executive branch.

Under article 48 of the Constitution, the President of the National Assembly is elected for the duration of the legislature (five years), while the mandate of the other members of the Bureau is renewable every year, by election, as required by the democratic process under the rule of law.

It is to be hoped that all the deputies of the nation, including members of the opposition parties, will return to the Assembly hall, because, following the democratic tradition, the National Assembly - not the street - is the proper place for political debate. Moreover, their return will enable these parties to take part in the re-election of the Bureau by presenting their candidates, instead of pursuing their current "empty-seat" policy.

As for the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in particular, in the Equateur region, the information which was provided to us by the Congolese and Chadian authorities indicates that this border zone with the Central African Republic has been completely pacified, thereby consolidating the positions of the Central African Republic, the neighbouring countries and MINURCA, which is responsible for keeping the peace.

In addition, in response to your concerns about how the financial and economic problems are to be solved, I attach herewith a note summarizing the Government's position (see enclosure III).

I hope that the information I have submitted will be helpful to the Council.

(Signed) Ange-Félix PATASSÉ

Enclosure I

Press release issued in Bangui on 13 January 1999

By Decree No. 99.001 of 2 January 1999, the National Assembly was convened in a special session from 4 to 18 January 1999.

The agenda dealt with the establishment of the Provisional Bureau, in conformity with the provisions of article 2 of the rules of procedure of the National Assembly.

The official ceremony inaugurating the Bureau took place on 4 January 1999 at 4 p.m. in the hall of the National Assembly under the chairmanship of Deputy Abel Goumba, the senior member.

In addition to the Government, led by His Excellency Michel Gbezera-Bria, Prime Minister and Head of the Government of Action to Promote Democracy, Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Central African Republic, and all the constituent State bodies attended the ceremony.

After the reading of the list of the deputies who had been elected and the customary speech by the Chairman of the Provisional Bureau, Deputy Jean-Paul Ngoupandé of Dékoa asked for the floor in order to make his conditions known.

The presiding officer, in violation of the provisions of the rules of procedure, acceded to that request, which gave rise to protests from the other members of the Assembly since, according to the rules of procedure, the Chairman should have adjourned the meeting without a debate.

After that incident, Mr. Ngoupandé walked out of the Assembly hall followed by other deputies from the opposition.

The presiding officer, who should have acted as mediator and therefore remained neutral, also decided to walk out of the Assembly along with the other members of the Bureau of Senior Members of the Opposition, without adjourning the meeting or taking leave of his guests.

Only Ms. Zane-Fé Touam Bona, Second Senior Member, remained in the Assembly hall with her colleagues, government deputies. Since that day, the Chairman of the Provisional Bureau has not convened the other members of the Bureau to determine the programme of work with a view to finalizing the composition of the Bureau.

It should be recalled that, according to article 48 of the Constitution of 14 January 1995, "the National Assembly elects its President for the duration of the legislature within the first eight days of its installation". This means that the new President of the National Assembly had to be elected by Monday, 11 January 1999, at the latest.

Without consulting the other members of the Bureau, the Chairman of the Provisional Bureau of the National Assembly issued a communiqué requesting all deputies to attend a meeting of the National Assembly on Monday, 11 January 1999, at 10 a.m., in order to finalize the composition of the Bureau.

On 11 January 1999, all the deputies gathered in the Assembly hall, as the Chairman of the Bureau of Senior Members had requested.

The opposition asked for the floor and, to the amazement of everyone present, this time raised the question of allotting seats on the Bureau of the National Assembly which, according to the opposition, should be done by consensus, instead of the proceeding as in the "Koudoufara affair".

According to the opposition, the presidency of the National Assembly should automatically go to the opposition, together with a vice-presidency, one post of questeur, one post of secretary and one post of member of the Bureau.

For its part, the Presidential Majority would be satisfied with two vice-presidents, one post of questeur, one post of secretary and one post of member of the Bureau.

After several hours of discussion and, in order to ensure that the discussion did not take the form of a plenary debate, it was agreed that each "camp" should withdraw to confer in private.

When the meeting was resumed at 4 p.m., the opposition continued to insist that it should hold the presiding officer's chair: "Presidency of the National Assembly or nothing".

In such circumstances, the Chairman of the Bureau of Senior Members stated that he took it upon himself not to preside over the establishment of the Bureau, the vote on which would take place according to the usual procedure.

In the light of the foregoing, the deputies of the Government, meeting on 11 January 1999 in the Assembly hall, took note of the statement made by Deputy Abel Goumba, Chairman of the Bureau of Senior Members.

Considering and noting that the Bureau of Senior Members had defected, they concluded that the Bureau of Senior Members, established on 4 January 1999, had disqualified itself.

In order to finalize the composition of the Bureau within the prescribed time-limits, they decided on 11 January 1999 at 6.30 p.m. to form a new Provisional Bureau as follows:

Chairman of the Provisional Bureau, Senior Member:	Marie-Josèphe Zane-Fé Touam Bona
Members:	Gabriel Dotte Badekara
	Maguelé Poutya
	Jean Sayo
	Jean-Michel Mandaba
	Théophile Ganro
	Dieudonné Koudoufara

The new Bureau immediately discharged its duty by finalizing the composition of the Bureau of the National Assembly as follows:

Presidency

President:	Deputy Luc-Apollinaire Dondon Konamabaye
First Vice-President:	Deputy Guy Ningata
Second Vice-President:	Deputy Simon Moussapiti
Third Vice-President:	Deputy Faustin Montsoki
Questeurs:	Deputy Marie Agba
	Deputy Michel N'Gako

Parliamentary secretariat

First Parliamentary Secretary:	Deputy Dieudonné Gomitoua
Second Parliamentary Secretary:	Deputy Dieudonné Koudoufara
Members:	Deputy Luc Guela
	Deputy Rigaud Nguialo
	Deputy Pierre Selessoui

(Signed) Luc-Apollinaire DONDON KONAMABAYE
President of the National Assembly

Enclosure II

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF LAWS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMITTEES

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Unity - Dignity - Labour

Parliamentary committees

Committee on Foreign Affairs

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
01	Maitart, Djim-Arém	MLPC[1]	Government
02	Ningata, Guy	MLPC	Government
03	Dondon Konamabaye, Luc-Apollinaire	MLPC	Government
04	Ngoagbada Kouzoutchiam, Simon-Silas	ADP[2]	Opposition
05	Malemindou, Joseph	FPP[3]	Opposition
06	Dombia Dobélé, Emmanuel	MLPC	Government
07	Mamadou Raikina, Moïse	MLPC	Government
08	Deguère, Marc	MLPC	Government
09	Pobori-Ndong, Barthélémy	Independent	Government
10	Koudoufara, Dieudonné	MLPC	Government
11	Ngoupandé, Jean-Paul	PUN[4]	Opposition
12	Moningué, Anne-Marie	MDD[5]	Opposition
13	Nakombo-Yani, Blaise	RDC[6]	Opposition
14	Pingama, Joseph	RDC	Opposition
15	Aubertel, Jean-Claude	RDC	Opposition

[1] Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain.

[2] Alliance pour la démocratie et le progrès.

[3] Front patriotique pour le progrès.

[4] Parti d'union nationale.

[5] Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement.

[6] Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain.

Committee on Economy, Finance and Planning

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
01	Nguialo, Rigaud	MLPC	Government
02	Ngama, Joseph Gérard	MLPC	Government
03	Doumsou, Martin	MLPC	Government
04	Agba, Marie	MLPC	Government
05	Guela, Luc	MLPC	Government
06	Sorongope, Eric	MLPC	Government
07	Mandaba, Jean-Michel	MLPC	Government
08	Ganro, Théophile	MLPC	Government
09	N'Gako, Michel	MLPC	Government
10	Gbeti, Jacob	RDC	Opposition
11	Modida Béné Nouyogodé	PSD[7]	Opposition
12	Goumba, Abel	FPP	Opposition
13	Maguelé Poutya	MLPC	Government
14	Soussou, Fidèle	MLPC	Government
15	Kolingba, Désiré	RDC	Opposition
16	Nakombo, Émile Gros-Raymond	RDC	Opposition

Committee on Education and Social Affairs

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
01	Mossambou, Moctar Samuel	PSD	Opposition
02	Yangongo-Boganda, Alphonsine	MDD	Opposition
03	Bounguinza, Jean-Marius	MLPC	Government
04	Wafio, Marie	MLPC	Government
05	Zane-Fé Touam-Bona, Marie-Josèphe	Independent	Government
06	Touba, Théophile	RDC	Opposition
07	Sanzé, Jacques	MLPC	Government
08	Wougané, Philippe	RDC	Opposition
09	Andjigbo-Djanga, Alain Albert	RDC	Opposition
10	Kolissio, Gilbert	ADP	Opposition
11	Yamété, Martin	MLPC	Government

[7] Parti social démocrate.

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
12	Yandé, Jean-Bruce	MLPC	Government
13	Salé, Georges	MLPC	Government
14	Mberio, Albert	MLPC	Government
15	Kolingba, Mireille	RDC	Opposition
16	Ngboukouzou, André	RDC	Opposition

Committee on Defence

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
01	Patasse, Lucienne	MLPC	Government
02	Koazo, Thomas	MLPC	Government
03	Selessoui, Pierre	MLPC	Government
04	Zackaria Oumar Abdraman	FPP	Opposition
05	Koumandé, Jacques	MLPC	Government
06	Laninga, Bastos Gaston	PSD	Opposition
07	Malendoma, Timothée	FC[8]	Opposition
08	Massi, Charles	FODEM[9]	Opposition
09	Gamba, Louis-Pierre	RDC	Opposition
10	Guitoka, David	RDC	Opposition
11	Bongolape, Simon	MDD	Opposition
12	Zouhoutou, Jean-Michel	PUN	Opposition
13	Baketo, Jean	PUN	Opposition
14	Oubat-Tessoubé, Jean-De Dieu	RDC	Opposition
15	Dobot-Zéro, Paulin Germain	RDC	Opposition
16	Sébalé, Hilaire	Independent	Opposition

[8] Forum civique.

[9] Forum démocratique pour la modernité.

Committee on the Interior, Laws and Administrative Affairs

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
01	Otokpio, Daniel	UPR[10]	Opposition
02	Meiganga, Jean-Marc	MLPC	Government
03	Sanghamy-Kilo, Alphonse	MLPC	Government
04	Zabio Maa Zabio	MLPC	Government
05	Endjimoungou, Patrice	FPP	Opposition
06	Ganikpio, Albert Simplice	ADP	Opposition
07	Ndebouli, Albert	MLPC	Government
08	Gbanga, Fidèle	MLPC	Government
09	Boua, Barthélémy	MLPC	Government
10	Pouzère, Henri	Independent	Opposition
11	Yembé, Jacques	MDD	Opposition
12	Doubané, Charles	ADP	Opposition
13	Balenguélé Zarambaud, Marguérite	RDC	Opposition
14	Ndophort-Nakombo, Hubert	RDC	Opposition
15	Mokolé, Jean-Marie	MDD	Opposition

Committee on Equipment and Communications

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
01	Sayo, Jean	MLPC	Government
02	Montsoki, Faustin	MLPC	Government
03	Gassicard, Jean-Pierre Félix	RDC	Opposition
04	Katekondji, Joseph	PSD	Opposition
05	Maidy, Nestor	FPP	Opposition
06	Kezza-Koyangbo, Cymossi Étienne	ADP	Opposition
07	Nderegandji, André	MLPC	Government
08	Neby Issa, Michel	MLPC	Government
09	Zoufouck-Ouilibona, Jean-Guy	MLPC	Government
10	Goyango, Joachim	FODEM	Opposition
11	Alleas Zackaria	RDC	Opposition
12	Gbeda, Roger	RDC	Opposition

[10] Union pour la République.

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
13	Molomadon, Brice-Rufin Léon	MDD	Opposition
14	Sidik Younouss	MLPC	Government
15	Langandji, Daniel	RDC	Opposition

Committee on Production, Natural Resources and the Environment

No.	Last name, first name(s)	Political party	Remarks
01	Gobolo, David	MLPC	Government
02	Gomitoua, Dieudonné	PLD	Government
03	Moussa Ndoa, Etienne	MLPC	Government
04	Nganamandji, Pierre Login	MLPC	Government
05	Orokas, Félix	MLPC	Government
06	Doté Badekara, Gabriel	MLPC	Government
07	Moussapiti, Simon	MLPC	Government
08	Yakata, David	RDC	Opposition
09	Biloko, Antoine	PUN	Opposition
10	Niakangou, Alphonse	MLPC	Government
11	Maleguia, Joseph	MLPC	Government
12	Dassinou, Pierre	MLPC	Government
13	Malendélé-Laguèrre, Alphonse	PSD	Opposition
14	Dimbélé, Mathurin	PLD	Government
15	Aladji, Ibrahim	MLPC	Government

Enclosure III

Note on the progress of the structural adjustment programme, published in Banqui on 6 February 1999

I. STRUCTURAL REFORMS

A. Cotton sector: adoption of a series of measures to ensure the sustainability of the cotton sector prior to the issuance of seasonal credits

The projected deficit in this sector has been estimated at CFAF 4.3 billion. After a number of meetings with economic actors in the sector, including the State, the Société cotonnière centrafricaine (SOCOCA) (Central African Cotton Corporation), bankers, shippers and the French Development Agency, several solutions were put forward:

- The State agreed to provide the sector with a subsidy of up to CFAF 1,677 million. This amount has been included in the 1999 budget;

- The internal efforts of SOCOCA and the renegotiation of shipping contracts are estimated at CFAF 800 million;

- The State has approached its partners, the French Development Agency and the Compagnie française pour le développement des fibres textiles (French Company for the Development of Textile Fibres), for support in financing the remaining deficit. The French Development Agency responded favourably to this request, with some conditions. This reassured financial backers in the sector, who completed the financing of the current season. This season is already under way and 6,000 tons of cotton are en route to the port of Douala.

A round-table discussion on the sector is being prepared with a view to seeking a lasting solution. All actors in the sector, including representatives of producers, will be invited.

B. PETROCA (the national petroleum products distribution company)

The discussions have progressed considerably: the two parties have reached agreement on virtually all the concerns voiced on either side. A meeting has been scheduled for the week of 8 to 13 February in Paris to finalize the protocol of agreement.

C. Execution of judicial documents to finalize the liquidation of certain enterprises and of four State banks which are no longer active

The following financial institutions have been liquidated by order of the authorities: the National Development Bank, the Central African Investment Bank, the Central African National Deposit Bank and LONACA.

The following non-financial institutions have been liquidated by order of the authorities: the Société centrafricano-roumaine pour l'exploitation, l'industrialisation et la commercialisation du bois (LOROM-BOIS) (Central

African-Romanian Corporation for the Exploitation, Industrialization and Marketing of Timber), Centrafricaine d'hydrocarbures (CENTRA-HYDRO) (Central African Hydrocarbons), the Librairie centrafricaine (Central African Book Corporation), the Société centrafricaine d'exploitation forestière et industrielle (Central African Forestry and Industrial Corporation), SALCAPA, SOCALIMINE and SOCALIMEX.

The following enterprises are in the process of being liquidated: the Banque de crédit agricole et de développement (Agricultural Credit and Development Bank), the Caisse de stabilisation et de péréquation (Stabilization and Adjustment Fund), the Société nationale de l'habitat (SNH) (National Housing Corporation) and the Conseil centrafricain des chargeurs (Central African Shipping Council). This simply involves putting in order real estate titles for which mortgage commitments have been issued so as to facilitate the subsequent transfer of assets to the collection agency.

D. Restructuring of public enterprises

The files on the other enterprises have been completed and transmitted to the National Assembly with respect to:

- The merger of the National Labour Office and the National Interprofessional Education and Training Organization;

- The liquidation of the National Water Corporation and the reorganization of the Central African Water Distribution Corporation.

II. BUDGETARY MEASURES

A. Price structure of petroleum products and collection of duties, taxes and charges owed by PETROCA to the State and to the Highway Fund

In this regard, an interministerial decree establishing the new price structure for petroleum products was signed in November 1998. This measure entered immediately into force.

With respect to the collection of arrears in the duties, taxes and charges owed by PETROCA to the State and to the Highway Fund, verification operations are under way and the international firm SODETEG (Société des études techniques d'entreprises générales), which prepared the report on domestic debts, has been invited to visit Bangui next week to complete this case prior to the review by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

B. Issuance of notices of payment due on the debt reassigned to public enterprises

An inventory of the debt reassigned to public enterprises has been taken. Collection orders have been prepared and transmitted to the enterprises concerned.

C. Systematic reconciliation of the value of customs issuances for timber imports and exports with the values certified by the private corporation for supervising and strengthening diamond export procedures

This is an ongoing measure being carried out by the General Division of Customs and Indirect Taxes and by SGS. A table summarizing the results achieved has already been prepared. With respect to the strengthening of procedures to ensure the physical security of diamond exports, an endorsement to the SGS contract is being finalized. An SGS mission visited Bangui on 15 January 1999 and debated this aspect of the case with the Prime Minister and the Deputy Minister of Finance in charge of the budget. Proposals for the practical introduction of these arrangements are awaited from SGS.

III. BENCHMARKS

A. Elimination of domestic debt

This work is currently being finalized. The international firm SODETEG is expected in Bangui next week to carry out the final verification.

B. Restructuring of the Banque internationale centrafricaine (BICA)

Invitations to bid for the privatization of BICA have been issued and a protocol of agreement between the partners was signed on 26 December 1998 (the Belgian partner and COFIPA). Currently, the capital has been entirely paid up by both foreign and national partners. The restructuring of BICA is therefore complete.

C. Restructuring of the Union bancaire en Afrique centrale (UBAC) (Central African Banking Union)

Discussions are under way among the Government, the partners concerned by the privatization of UBAC and the World Bank. The Bank has just completed a series of consultations with major foreign banks on the acquisition of UBAC. The results of these consultations will be available shortly.

D. Payment by the State of its share of the capital of the Banque populaire maroco-centrafricaine (Moroccan-Central African People's Bank)

This State share has been included in the proposed budget for 1999.

E. Adoption of a finance law consistent with the objectives of the revised programme with respect to the elimination of earmarked receipts, with the exception of the Highway Fund, money earmarked for the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) and FIDE

This measure is contained in the draft Budget Act for 1999.

F. Privatization of the Société d'énergie centrafricaine (Central African Energy Corporation)

The authorities, together with the World Bank, have issued limited invitations to bid. Some replies have been received by the Commission for the Privatization of Public Enterprises. This operation, which is being carried out jointly with the World Bank, is proceeding normally.

IV. COMMENTS ON PUBLIC FINANCES

As at 31 December 1998, the estimated results are as follows:

(a) Public revenues (based on the Treasury) currently amount to CFAF 44,219 million, as compared to CFAF 29,160 million in 1997, representing an increase of over 52 per cent and reflecting the vigorous efforts made to achieve this result. However, this amount, which is 90 per cent of the amount foreseen, remains slightly below the estimated amount of CFAF 49,037 million.

(b) Public expenditure amounts to CFAF 56,913 million, as compared to CFAF 29,739 million in 1997. This amount is clearly less than the estimate of CFAF 63,600 million, and represents 89 per cent of the latter amount. The breakdown is as follows: (i) current expenditure, CFAF 20,351 million; (ii) capital expenditure, CFAF 921 million; (iii) debt payments, CFAF 11,266 million; (iv) arrears, CFAF 24,375 million; and (v) Treasury operations, CFAF 436 million.

(c) Budget performance, based on the Treasury, shows a significant mobilization of receipts in comparison to the preceding year, despite the many difficulties encountered, especially in the last quarter of 1998. These difficulties include:

- The impact of the Asian crisis, which has begun to have serious effects on the economy of the Central African Republic in the timber, diamond and cotton sectors;

- The war in the two Congos, which has blocked the supply of fuel through Kinshasa and of merchandise by the Congo/ocean railroad;

- The shipping strike in Cameroon, which interrupted the supply of goods by this route for more than a month.

The country was totally strangled during the last quarter of 1998. Political action at the highest level was necessary to clear up the situation around November 1998. Owing to the legislative elections, economic actors adopted a wait-and-see attitude up to the end of the year.

The initial financial arrangements had foreseen the inflow of external funds at the end of December 1998 (IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank) in the amount of over CFAF 16 billion. However, these funds were not received, whereas large amounts due at the end of the year remained payable.

Despite its difficulties, the Government, in accordance with its determination to pursue the structural adjustment programme, has given priority to the amounts due to IMF and the World Bank (CFAF 2.5 billion at the end of December), at the expense of civil servants' wages. Currently, the country is in good standing with those two institutions, and hopes that, following the review, it will benefit from financial flows in the opposite direction to support its domestic efforts.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/133
10 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1177 (1998) of 26 June 1998 and 1226 (1999) of 29 January 1999,

Expressing its grave concern regarding the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the resumption of hostilities between the parties,

Recalling the commitment of Ethiopia and Eritrea to a moratorium on the threat of and use of air strikes,

Stressing that the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea constitutes a threat to peace and security,

1. Condemns the recourse to the use of force by Ethiopia and Eritrea;

2. Demands an immediate halt to the hostilities, in particular the use of air strikes;

3. Demands that Ethiopia and Eritrea resume diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict;

4. Stresses that the Framework Agreement as approved by the Central Organ Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution on 17 December 1998 (S/1998/1223, annex) remains a viable and sound basis for a peaceful resolution of the conflict;

5. Expresses its full support for the efforts of the OAU, the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy for Africa, and concerned Member States to find a peaceful resolution to the present hostilities;

6. Calls upon Ethiopia and Eritrea to ensure the safety of the civilian population and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law;

7. Strongly urges all States to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/134
10 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you a statement issued by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 10 February 1999.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-03514 (E) 100299

/...

Annex

Statement issued by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia on 10 February 1999

On 12 May 1998, Eritrea carried out an act of aggression against Ethiopia and occupied its territory. Since then, various attempts have been made by third parties to avert the widening of the crisis and to facilitate a peaceful resolution. Ethiopia has done whatever was necessary to cooperate with those who have made their good offices available and to give peace a chance. It has never even once shown lack of cooperation with those who extended their facilitation to remove the cause of the crisis. No one, least of all the United Nations and those involved in the various efforts to broker peace, could have failed to observe the patience Ethiopia has shown in the face of Eritrea's egregious obstinacy and contempt for the role of third parties. Eritrea wanted to negotiate with itself and on its own terms.

Ethiopia accepted the peace plan put forward by the United States of America and Rwanda; Eritrea rejected it. Ethiopia expressed its readiness to embrace the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Framework Agreement which was characterized by the Security Council as fair and balanced. Eritrea, after dragging its feet for a while, finally said it sought clarification before it would pronounce itself on the OAU peace proposal. After the OAU clarification was provided, Eritrea thought it would sleep on it, in the meantime continuing to prevaricate with the clear intention of avoiding being pinned down. All this while still occupying Ethiopian territory, from which thousands of Ethiopians have been uprooted and are now living in caves.

The final Eritrean response to the OAU peace plan came on 6 February 1999, after already having violated the air strike moratorium the previous day, when Eritrea mounted a large-scale military offensive on the Badme-Shiraro front, thus imposing war on Ethiopia and leaving Ethiopia with only one option, which is to exercise its right of self-defence which, like all sovereign States, is its right under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Eritrea by resorting once again to force intended to create a new scenario which would sideline the OAU peace plan. This cannot be allowed to succeed.

What has been clear all along has been made all the more clear now. The Eritrean authorities are determined to get what they want and what is not theirs through force, whatever the consequences for peace. International law does not count for the Eritrean authorities. What they have is contempt for peace proposals unless those proposals are drafted in Asmara and unless all they contain is the Eritrean view and ideas reflecting Eritrean interests, including their desire to keep what they have taken through aggression.

Ethiopia has always made it clear that, while it would always be second to none in its commitment to peace, it would never ever allow the violation of its sovereign territory to be rewarded and the dignity of its people to be insulted.

The road to peace is clear and it has been charted by the Organization of African Unity. Eritrea has so far refused to respect the voice of Africa

because it has concluded that the international community is unlikely to bring effective and meaningful pressure to bear on Asmara. Stay put, prevaricate and cause the deterioration of the situation and then both the aggressor and the aggressed would probably be put on the same level: this is what Eritrea has been counting on - a victory for the aggressor in a situation where international law is made a mockery of.

Ethiopia calls once again upon the international community to prevail upon Eritrea to accept and implement the OAU Framework Agreement for peace proposed by African heads of State. The United Nations cannot ignore this. Africa should not allow it. The Security Council should not and must not encourage the aggressor country to defy the Organization of African Unity and the Security Council as well; after all, the Council itself is on record as having endorsed the OAU Framework Agreement as fair and balanced.

Let me conclude by saying that our unlimited readiness to cooperate with third parties who have worked for peace, our patience in the face of aggression and our flexibility should not be mistaken for being prone to being pushed around.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/135
10 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1999 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of the Sudan wishes to retain on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized item 4 of paragraph 7 of the summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration (S/1999/25), entitled "Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General (S/3963)".

I would be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mubarak Hussein RAHMTALLA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-03543 (E) 100299

UNITED
NATIONS

A S

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/53/823
S/1999/136
10 February 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda items 39, 40 and 84
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER
ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 9 February 1999 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I write to you with regard to the letter addressed to you from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations on 1 February 1999 (S/1999/105). The content of that letter, which follows a recent disturbing pattern of repetitive distortions and false statements, is regrettable and does not qualify a response at a time when the whole world is well aware of the reality of the state of the peace process and the responsibility the Israeli Government bears in this regard, especially the freezing of the Wye River Memorandum. This pattern of distortion has reached a point of absurdity and it would be fruitless to become entangled in any sort of rebuttal. Indeed, the response to the above-mentioned letter can be found in the clear positions reaffirmed by the international community as demonstrated recently by Member States through the resumption of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 39, 40 and 84, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Nasser AL-KIDWA
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations

99-03526 (E) 100299